

Image, Crypt, Interpretation

Deciphering a symbol consists of divided halves of pre-symbolic unity re-assembling into a whole (*syn-ballein*). In the psychoanalytical sense, the split of this original unity yields the possibility of an emergence of the Unconscious. Nicolas Abraham and Maria Török wrote:

*Psychoanalytical listening consists of a special way of treating language. Whereas normally we are given meanings, the analyst is given symbols. Symbols are data that are missing an as yet undetermined part [...]. The special aim of psychoanalytical listening is to find the symbol's complement, recovering it from indeterminacy. From the beginning of psychoanalysis to the present, theoretical efforts have been aimed at finding rules that will permit us to find the unknown missing complement, in other words, the fragment that "symbolizes with" – or, we might say, that "cosymbolizes".*¹

If we were to treat thus understood "psychoanalytical listening" as a simple model, based on analogy, of all sorts of interpretations of the narrative text – literary, film and painterly – then the task of the reader-spectator would consist of an identification of the concealed contents of the story (hidden deeper than its open and easily denoted theme), rendered dialectic by textual representation "interiorised" in it in such a way as if it were the patient's memory; it would also involve striving towards the establishment of source truth, the "primeval scene", the genuine "theme", the penetration "to the end" of its sense, etc. The difficulty of this task consists, however, of the fact that, as we found out in another study by Abraham, the symbol is **the outcome of a covert operation**.

So, originally, any symbol is a metaphor. It is the repression of its metaphoric origin that makes the symbol.

Naturally, repression from the very onset assumes a repression instrument. When, subsequently, the two parts are linked again the symbol ceases to be a symbol.

Interpretation, therefore, does not consist only of revealing the concealed ("repressed") contents. A condition for its effectiveness – and this is often forgotten – is to take into account also the instrument of repression.

The symbol is thus a dual metaphor of that, which is cut off and of the process of cutting as such. When we listen to the patient and treat his comments as symbolic we embark upon the recreation of the cut off part together with the moment of cutting (an introjection of the repressed) and the creation, on the level of the word, of new integrity.²

This is not all, nor is it the entire difficulty that can be posed by the interpreted story (of a patient). It also happens that **listening encounters a discourse, which, apparently, does not wish to take part in the quest for a co-symbol and rejects all attempts at supplementation. This resembles a situation when a puzzle totally conceals the discourse, much too dense for deciphering in the course of ordinary listening, or when the discourse does not lead to any sort of co-symbol or puzzle.**³

Metaphorisation does not succeed when instead of symbols the analyst receives in the interpreted narration "true enigmas". They come into being as a result of shattering the traditional topic structure of the symbol, i.e. when its second half – originally unclear and absent, and now thanks to analysis recovered (as the sought *signifié*) – becomes once again split apart; when the line of the split transfers deep into the recesses of the symbol, creating a "false", "artificial" unconsciousness that cannot be named and metaphorised, a *prothetic* installed in the split "Ego". This is precisely the "crypt" and its "effect".

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The concept of the "crypt" was proposed in the 1960s by Nicolas Abraham and Maria Török, French psychoanalysts of Hungarian descent, who in a highly original fashion developed the thoughts of Sándor Ferenczi, student and collaborator of Sigmund Freud.⁴ The "crypt effect" was also described by Jacques Derrida in *Fors*, a copious preface to a book by Abraham and Török: *Cryptonymie. Le verbière de l'homme aux loups*.⁵

In the interpretation proposed by Derrida the "crypt" is one of those conceits that serve probing the boundaries of metaphysical spatial logic. As the readers of his successive books know such figures as: "supplement", *tympanum*, *hymen*, *pharmakon*, *khora*, *parergon*, *parages*, "invagination", etc. ..., in a model-like manner (but rather emulating the graphic models of "im-

possible figures”) deconstructed the simple antithesis of the interior and exterior comprehended “rationally” as cohesive, homogeneous, and symmetrical wholes.⁶ With their assistance Derrida constructed paradoxical topographies, in which this simple schematisation unexpectedly lost its transparency and revealed the “violence” inscribed within it – it “grew wild” and gained aporetic properties. In this *la cartographie impossible*, to cite Derrida, or *atopy*, the boundary between those two spheres shifted. In a classical interpretation, the frame (e.g. of a painting) tightly “closes” the interior, guaranteeing distinctness and intact original identity; at the same time – from the perspective of this interior – it “does not exist”. Derrida claimed that such a simple structure is impossible since total separation of the interior and the exterior is also unfeasible: in the text/image the cognitive (referential) aspect is always joined by a performative force, making it impossible to conclusively close the frames. This is the reason why the “edge”, conceived as an indispensable condition for “completing” the identity of the interior, becomes in the latter an irremovable “fold” of the exterior, undermining its completeness.

Such paradoxical spatiality is characteristic also for the model of human subjectivity constructed by Abraham and Török; hence Derrida’s interest in the concept of the crypt, which he tried to describe by using, i.a. the titular *fors*.

Since the French noun: *for* (plural: *fors*) is a greatly ambiguous word, and difficult to translate to boot, let us precede the quotation from Derrida with several explanations. This spatial description is affiliated with the Latin *forum*, i.e. a public square in Rome, the site of court trials – it denotes a “justice tribunal”. This is why the literary expression: *le for intérieur* (derived, historically speaking, from old legal terminology referring to Church jurisdiction) described an inner, most personal “tribunal of consciousness”, *sui generis* conscience. On the other hand, the interesting etymology of this word going back to the Indo-European language (**dhuer*, **dwer*) discloses its specifically “penetrating” sense (thus rendering it slightly similar to the Greek *krinein*: to “separate”, to “judge”, hence: “crisis” and “critic”). Suffice to recall that the Latin verb: *forare* means: “to perforate” (hence: “perforation”) and *foris* means: “door”, adverb – “on the outside”, just as *foris* signifies: “outside the door” (or from an opposite perspective: “go outside the door”, as in the Evangelical summons by Jesus: *Lazare, veni foras* – *Lazarus, come forth*). This is, therefore, the origin of the English: *foreign*, the Italian: *fuori*, or the French: *hors, dehors* as well as the noun: *forest, forêt* referring to outer, “alien” space, etc. Hence in French the form: *fors* (the plural) is an archaic preposition, which means: “without”, “with the exception of”, “while preserving”.

Interestingly, this is also the etymology of the Polish words: *drzwi* (doors) and *dwór* (outside). Not by accident is the second used in the expression “outside” (*na dworze*). It also signifies, as we know, a building (manor house: *dwór, dworek, dworzec*), which makes it possible to sometimes use the Old Polish *fora ze dwora* (get outside), with *dwór* meaning the interior. It also exists as *podwórze* and *podwórzec* (courtyard) or even *dwór królewski* (royal court), i.e. courtyard, patio or open space but inside a certain closed area. Already in our times, *dworzec* (station) is a place, which albeit localised within urban space opens up the town from the inside, thus making possible communication with the outside world.

With the assistance of the multi-meaning *fors* – contrasted with the French *hors* (“outside”, “on the outside”), or *le tribunal de la conscience* – Derrida attempted to situate the paradoxical space of the “crypt” in the construction of the subject. At the onset, however, he sketched its place in the architectural model (I cite this fragment while translating *for* as *dwór*)⁷:

*Constructing a system of partitions, with their inner and outer surfaces, the cryptic enclave produces a cleft in space, in the assembled system of various places, in the architectonics of the open square within space, itself delimited by a generalized closure in the forum. Within this forum, space where the free circulation and exchange of objects and speeches can occur, the crypt constructs another, more inward forum [...]: sealed and thus internal to itself, a secret interior within the public square, but, by the same token, outside it, external to the interior. Whatever one might write upon them, the crypt’s parietal surfaces do not simply separate an inner forum [un for intérieur] from an outer forum [un for extérieur]. The inner forum is (a) safe, an outcast inside the inside. This is the condition, and the stratagem, of the cryptic enclave’s ability to isolate, to protect, to shelter from any penetration, from anything that can filter in from them outside along with air, light, or sounds, along with the eye or the ear, the gesture or the spoken word. Caulked or padded along its inner partition, with cement or concrete on the other side the cryptic safe protects from the outside the very secret of its clandestine inclusion or its internal exclusion.*⁸

The “crypt” thus denotes an inner split of the interior, which in this fashion ceases being a simple supplement of the exterior. It constitutes a concealed core of this topical structure, preserving certain features of alienness in relation to the interior, whose part it is. *Forum* is part of social space that may be, for example, delineated with ordinary cartographic methods, but the crypt, that external *dwór*, cannot be either mapped or discovered (even when magnified). All classical topologies, -graphies, -nymies come across an insurmountable obstacle, i.e. the sort that simply cannot be

overcome. This is “non-place” (*non-lieu*), which is not situated *somewhere* (here or there), but (I would be inclined to say that in the manner of *trompe l’oeil* or *fata morgana*) it exists exclusively as *deformation*.

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Nicolas Abraham and Maria Török were interested primarily in the “cryptonymic” (a-semantic, “anasemic”) aspect of language that does not serve the transmission of meanings but their concealment. This conception attaches key significance to a reinterpretation of two conceits well known to psychoanalysis: introjection and incorporation, describing the relation between the outer world of the subject and surrounding reality.

The first was introduced into the language of psychoanalysis by Sándor Ferenczi in 1909 while defining introjection (i.e. “projection to the interior”) as a mechanism **enabling the extension onto the outer world of the originally auto-erotic involvement by including objects of the outer world into the Ego.**⁹ To put it differently, this time in the words of Freud: **Love is initially auto-narcissistic and subsequently encompasses objects incorporated into the expanded “Ego”.**¹⁰ Introjection was usually identified with incorporation (or it was perceived as an earlier stage of the same process), which in *Mourning and Melancholia* (1915) Freud described as an economic response to the loss of an object of love, with which the Ego wishes to identify itself.¹¹ In the opinion of Abraham and Török, however, it is necessary to radically differentiate or even counter the two concepts since each brings totally different consequences. **I n t r o j e c t i o n** is to correspond to “normal” mourning, while **i n c o r p o r a t i o n** is the “illness of mourning”, which appears whenever introjection for some reason fails. Incorporation intends to *recover, in secret and through magic, an object*: it acts suddenly, fantasmically, sometimes in a hallucinatory manner, resembling plunder of sorts. It emerges, however, always along the borderline of introjection and pretends to be it so under the illusion of “ordinary” concealment that it may obliterate the trace of hiding the incorporated object.

In the process of **i n t r o j e c t i o n** I ultimately recognize and accept the actual death of the deceased (or the loss of a person, object or animal close to me) and do not identify it with my death; this is to say I still love him/it but only as a well-integrated particle of myself. Loss is compensated by recollection enhancing the Ego, i.e. memorisation, the assimilation of certain values or, as Freud put it, “identification”. According to Judith Butler: *This identification is not simply momentary or occasional, but becomes a new structure of identity; in effect, the other becomes part of the Ego through the permanent internalization of the other’s attributes.*¹² Essentially, it is even possible to define the Ego as a

system of numerous introjections attained slowly, during a whole lifetime, in a laborious process of successive internalisations, adaptations, and assimilations of assorted successively lost objects of love (and even in the process of an anticipation of “possible deaths”). Introjection is the reason why such partings (for the child the first loss is the withdrawing mother), even if painful, become bearable.¹³

Meanwhile, **i n c o r p o r a t i o n** is a neurotic obstacle for introjection, a response submerged in melancholy: the subject does not come to terms with the loss because the lost object fulfilled the function of a mediator with his inner world. He thus tries to fantasmically and magically dominate the object of desire since, enclosed in the crypt, who becomes a “living dead” or, to use an expression coined by Maria Török, *le cadaver exquis*. Derrida thus wrote:

The inhabitant of a crypt is always a living dead, a dead entity we are perfectly willing to keep alive, but as dead, one we are willing to keep as long as we keep it, within us, intact in any way save as living.

This is, Abraham and Török claimed, *refoulement conservateur*. Unspeakable mourning creates inside the subject *un caveau secret*. *Dans la crypte repose, vivant, reconstitué à partir de souvenirs de mots, d’images et d’affects, le contenu objectal de la perte, en tant que personne complète, avec sa propre topique, ainsi que les moments traumatiques - effectifs ou supposés - qui avaient rendu l’introjection impraticable.*¹⁴ The incorporated object becomes *included* by the cryptophoric subject in the domain of the subconscious, but at the same time, in the manner of a parasite or a hardened cyst, it is *excluded* from the system of introjections creating the Ego, the sphere of the activity of any sort of a “tribunal of conscience”, which would want to conduct coordination and resolve emergent contradictions. Derrida wrote that **this boundary** (between introjection and incorporation) **is necessary for the localisation of the crypt, since it encircles within the Ego** (the introjection system) **a cryptic enclave as allogenic incorporation space.**

The basically important fact is that **i n t r o j e c t i o n** speaks, names, enters into a dialogue, is rendered dialectic (symbolised) by its representations, and thus is subjected to ordinary psychoanalysis. Words replace that, which is lost – they represent lost presence. This is progressing, fragmentary substitution, clearly visible in the model-like sequence of the development of a child: from a mouth full of the mother’s breast, *via* the “empty mouth” to the subsequent cries and sobs and a mouth full of words replacing the mother’s absence. Introjection is, therefore, “satisfaction”, “communion” or the “world of the empty mouth” signifying self-understanding in the face of experienced lack.

This also holds true for mourning: words simultaneously denote the object of desire and shift it, perform the withdrawal of emotional involvement, the libido. Butler wrote: *This displacement from the original object is an essentially metaphorical activity in which words “figure” the absence and surpass it.*¹⁵

Meanwhile, incorporation appears at the moment when the “emptiness of the mouth” in vain summons introjective words; when it becomes impossible to replace the lost object with words (because this would reveal, for example, some sort of a shameful secret of this ideal). If the subject is incapable of self-satiation with words (metaphors) it embarks upon more radical activity: it absorbs the imagined *thing*, a fantasm, an object-fetish, isolating it far from the conscious part of the Ego, enclosing it in the crypt. Incorporation is, therefore, a de-metaphorisation of the word: by annulling its figurative meanings it preserves the loss of an object as radically unnamable, in this way guarding its secret. Words, however, which have been deprived of their metaphorical carrying capacity do not simply return to literal meaning; they continue to act, performing a fantasmatic destruction of the language itself and neutralising it as an instrument of presentableness.¹⁶

The crypt, declared Derrida, is *lieu de silence*. If incorporation is heard, then it is only to silence all suspicion or revert attention from the incorporated object. Incorporation thus differs from introjection primarily due to the use to which language is put or the possibility of deciphering it. Cryptonymy turns out to be to “cryptology”: burial in a crypt or, to put it differently, ciphering (*Crypter, c’est chiffrer* - Derrida).

That what is to be read is *un texte crypté* on the walls of the crypt, a cipher on a crypt. The wall, however, is not the first – the material of which it is built constitutes the text. The cipher makes it impossible to be deciphered on the surface of the wall.¹⁷

This is why an object “buried in a crypt” does not succumb to ordinary analysis. The reason does not lie in the fact that the crypt is localised somewhere very deep, but in the material out of which it had been built, i.e. language. The crypt is not a metaphor of ordinary unconsciousness (the interior of external consciousness) but “false” or “artificial” unconsciousness, which not only conceals something but also hides the very fact of concealment, i.e. creates a linguistic opposition to the efforts of the analyst. The crypt is linguistic space. It speaks just like the unconscious, imitating normal introjection, but in this way leaves that inner non-place, which is not subjected to any sort of symbolisation, excluded and untouched (*sauf*). It is, therefore, impossible to simply open it, break the seal

and read the name because this would be a transformation of the crypt into an ordinary grave, *le cadaver exquis* into a “dearly departed”, and incorporation into introjection; this is, after all, of what the set trap consists ...

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In the conception devised by Abraham and Török the “crypt effect” has much in common with what these two researchers call: *l’effet de fantôme* – in both cases it signifies the psychic structures of incorporation, radically “decentralising”; in both instances the concept of the “secret” assumes special status. As in the case of the “living dead”, the phantom too cannot be integrated with the rest of the psychic life of the Ego – it puts up resistance and produces traumatic cracks. The situations, however, are not identical. The first was the outcome of failed mourning - the “alien” is incorporated into the crypt of the Ego; the second has a different etiology – the Ego encounters a “phantom” arriving from the unconsciousness of the “other”.

An excellent literary example of this difference is Shakespearean Hamlet. Without doubt, the problem of the Danish prince does not consist of the fact that he was unable to come to terms with the loss of his father and preserved him in his inner crypt as a “living dead” (subsequently enabling him to act secretly and as if autonomously). Shakespeare did not write about Hamlet’s crypt and his melancholy but, in the opinion of Abraham, about the secret, which the father took to his grave and which is now assumed by Hamlet. *It is the children’s or descendants’ lot to objectify these buried tombs through diverse species of ghosts.*¹⁸

*The appearance of the Father’s ghost at the start of the play objectifies the son’s awareness-unawareness [la science-nescience]. Awareness-unawareness of what? Of his own uneasiness due to a circumstance not to be doubted: the late King must have taken a secret with him to the grave. Does the ghost appear in order to lift the state of unawareness? If that were the case, the ghost’s objectification would have no more object than Hamlet’s own dubious “madness of doubt”. A ghost returns to haunt with the intent of lying; its would-be “revelations” are false by nature.*¹⁹

This is a hypothesis that for four centuries has been ignored by the spectators and critics of *Hamlet*: the “secret” disclosed by the ghost of old Hamlet containing the injunction to seek revenge is a trap. Actually, it conceals yet another, true secret of the shame borne by the father about which nothing can be said and of which the son is unaware but which leaves behind a certain trace. This is why the *sui generis* psychoanalytical investigation conducted by the young Hamlet, summed up in a theatrical reconstruction-repetition

based on the confession of the ghost, is doomed to fail. The revealed “truth” only calms that unease of ignorance, whose concretisation is the appearance of the Ghost.

The phantom, according to the interpretation proposed by Abraham and Török, is a phenomenon existing in a trans-generational dimension (one could say: a transsexual one, since it resembles a quotation although accepted together with the error or gap contained in the original); it consists of the presence in the living Ego of a deceased ancestor, albeit as a carrier of his trauma; the Ego is unaware of this presence despite the fact that it is the cause of his disturbances. Naturally, this has nothing in common with spiritualism. *It is a fact that the phantom, whatever its form, is nothing but the invention of the living. Yes, an invention in the sense that the phantom is meant to objectify, even if under the guise of individual or collective hallucinations the gap [lacune], the concealment of some part of a loved one's life produced in us.... Consequently, what haunts are not the dead, but the gaps left within us by the secrets of others.*²⁰

The “phantom effect” thus introduces an even more radical” heterogeneity, because it assumed a “heterocryptical” topos that does not concern the burial of an alien object in one's crypt but the encounter of the Ego and an object arriving from the crypt of another unconsciousness (*the corpse buried in the other*). Both “my” crypt, the effect of incorporation and the absorption of an alien object, which I do not want to lose, and the Phantom haunting me set into motion strategies drawing attention away from their secret. The law of the phantom obligates to remain ignorant.

The phantom is a formation of the unconscious, which was never conscious and thus fulfils a function different than repression; nonetheless, it returns periodically and resembles a trauma that never actually took place. According to Abraham, it *works like a ventriloquist, like a stranger within the subject's mental topography*. Abraham mentioned: (...) *by their gratuitousness in relation to the subject they create the impression of surrealistic flights of fancy or of oulipo-like verbal feats*. This is why the phantom is never experienced by the subject as something real, and in the course of analysis can only *give rise to constructions with all their attendant uncertainties*.²¹ This construction is difficult because the phantom resists “interpretation”, words capable of integrating themselves with the subconscious, i.e. libidinal introjection. The words, with whose assistance the phantom returns, i.e. those to which the child once paid attention when one of the parents uttered them, do not constitute a source of the phantom's statement, but an *interval* in that, which is tellable. This interval, accepted by the subject (since, as we have said, it is not the effect of its repression) and blocking the path towards introjec-

tion, becomes for him the same sort of a wound that it was for his ancestor.

Briefly, if the phantom haunting the Ego in some way makes its presence known then it does so not to confess the sins encumbering his heart or to get rid of a traumatic (horrible and possibly shameful) secret, but on the contrary, in order to “seal” it (to preserve this “skeleton in the cupboard”, his silence, the gap in the topography of his subjectivity). This is also **why the phantom in folk beliefs only objectifies the metaphor, active in the subconscious, of burying a shameful fact in an object**.²² It is thus necessary to treat with a great dose of suspicion the truthfulness of ghosts, including those haunting us in stories: they come not only to make it possible for the living to learn about the secret concealed in the grave but, on the contrary, by proposing false secrets to preserve it only as the unutterable.

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Introjection appears to be a good model of the text/image subjected to classical interpretation (analysis), striving towards revealing *c o n c e l e d* meanings – we recognise then that the work has been constructed in accordance with the classical logic of the symbol, and as a consequence we seek the missing (co-)symbolic supplement, i.e. strive towards the recreation of the “pre-symbolic”, “homogeneous” and “metaphorical” completeness of meaning. Is a text/image concealing a crypt, and inside the latter – “endocryptic life”, an incorporated cadaver (and even more so a phantom), possible?²³ Naturally, it is unnecessary to recall that no text or image is a neurotic patient of Dr Freud (even the author does not have to play this part - we are not dealing with psycho-biographies). In this case, the “crypt” is a “mere metaphor” (in addition, secondary in relation to the psychoanalytical metaphor). But this is a productive metaphor if we include psychoanalytical terminology into the interpretation procedure so as to diagnose “the illness”, which would summarise the meaning of the analysed text; on the contrary, the purpose should involve rather opening the text than reducing its possible meanings.²⁴

Naturally, there comes to mind the question: how to differentiate the cryptophoric (“cryptomimetic”) text from the same classical story (Abraham and Török: **deprived of what would the Wolf Man not be the Wolf Man but a classic patient?**)²⁵ One could formulate this doubt slightly differently: since the object encoded in the crypt (*encrypté*) is radically illegible and each attempt at deciphering his “name” means the necessity of falling into a cleverly devised trap, then is incorporation a concept possessing any sort of operational usefulness?²⁶ The task we are facing does not consist of forcing the text to act in the manner of an Egyptian mummy from a popular joke

and “confess” its real name; on the contrary, we are concerned with taking into account this uncertainty, the “cracks” in the meaning, the retention of the text in its “strangeness” and significant nonsense. The model of the “cryptophoric” text/image presupposes (differently than the model, which could be called “semiophoric”) an essential compilation of its “topical structure”, which as a consequence complicates the cognitive structure: the work resists classical questions about the “topic”, “message” and “sense”. We would be dealing with an image that not only conceals meaning (as an “ordinary” symbol) but also intermingles traces - the interpreted traces lose their cognitive credibility (mimetic value).

The “crypt” (as a conception that essentially expands the metaphoric of our understanding both of literature and the visual arts) is a premise making it possible to overcome a temptation typical for classical interpretation, namely, to replace the radical “hermeneutics” of the image (the absolute and irreducible²⁷ inaccessibility of its contents) with “hermeneutics” offering hope for penetrating the interior in order to decipher the text/image in a way resembling the one in which, for instance, archaeologists opened the Copernicus crypt in Frombork, i.e. in order to identify the deceased and prepare something resembling a definite death certificate (does this activity not bear the marks of some sort of enlightened exorcism?). As Professor Jerzy Gąssowski (also my professor when I was a student of archaeology), who conducted this task, said in a newspaper interview:

The research started with disinfecting the entry to the crypt. The latter had been closed several decades ago and its disinfection was indispensable so as not to expose scientists entering it to any sort of danger.

If our intention is penetration of “cryptophoric” books, paintings or films, then archaeological methods applied to neutralise a similar risk - prepared for scientists by a literary/painterly Copernicus or Tutankhamen – are pointless since it is impossible to differentiate the “crypt” from its “effect”, the danger created by it from its valuable contents sought by us, namely, the cadaver-death. The only real thing is precisely that hidden activity of the “curse” or the “microbes” breeding in the anasemic environment (an exemplary illustration of this paradox are the studies carried out by William of Baskerville on the second book of Aristotle’s *Poetics* dealing with comedy – as we know, it was dangerous both owing to its contents and the poison protecting access to it and covering the pages of the only existing copy). It is the deadly resistance put up by the crypt (Derrida: *la résistance interne du caveau*), its resilient matter or irremovable frame that could prove to be the real stake in this research game, the

concealed name, the sought after Thing (*La Chose*). **That what is to be read is un texte crypté on the walls of the crypt, a cipher on a crypt. The wall, however, is not the first – the material of which it is built constitutes the text. The cipher makes it impossible to be deciphered on the surface of the wall.**²⁸

Derrida radicalised both the “crypt effect” and the “phantoms”. In accordance with the conception proposed by Abraham if ghosts lie and cheat then they should be subjected to suitable exorcisms, reintroducing their secret into the order of things (even if this is an extremely difficult task). For Derrida, however, incorporation, the crypt and the phantom cease being a symptom of psycho-pathology; in the same way, the status of the secret concealed in the crypt or brought by the phantom haunting the subject also changes. There is no way to tame it, domesticate it in the stable domain of ontology or express it in the language of knowledge (on the wall of the crypt). All operations serving its deciphering (the preparation of the crypt for research) serve the process of concealing an even greater mystery, namely, that there is no (other) mystery (to be discovered as a primeval object to be restored to knowledge). The only real thing is “endocryptic identification”, i.e. irreducible knowledge-non-knowledge, and endless construction work.²⁹

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In order to identify the valuable cadaver it is necessary to localise its crypt; for this purpose we must identify the boundary between introjection and incorporation. This border, however, always appears at the end of introjection, similar to it although always slightly further, accessible not only as *that* word but merely as its rhyme, deformation, shadow, trace of a trace... This is precisely the death (lurking in the crypt) of the image.

Endnotes

- ¹ Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, *Cryptonymie. Le verbier de l'homme aux loups*, Paris: Flammarion 1976, p. 230.
- ² N. Abraham, *L'unité duelle et le fantôme*, in: Nicolas Abraham, Maria Torok, *L'Écorce et le noyau*, Flammarion: Paris 1978, p. 394 [emphasis - W. M.]. I explain the concept of introjection slightly further on.
- ³ Abraham and Torok, *Cryptonymie*, op. cit., p. 230.
- ⁴ Their studies from the 1960s and 1970s were collected in: *L'Écorce et le noyau*, supplemented by: *Cryptonymie*, a “cryptonymic” reinterpretation of the famous case of the Wolf Man. Sándor Ferenczi lived in 1873-1933; Nicolas Abraham – in 1919-1975; Maria Torok – in 1926-1998.
- ⁵ Jacques Derrida, *Fors: les mots anglais de Nicolas Abraham et Maria Torok*, in: Abraham and Torok, *Cryptonymie*, op. cit., pp. 9-73.
- ⁶ See also, i.a. Derrida: *O gramatologii* (Warszawa 1999), *Marginesy filozofii* (Warszawa 2002), *La dissemination* (Paris 1972), *Chora* (Warszawa 1999), *Prawda w malar-*

- stwie (Gdańsk 2003), *Survivre* and *La loi du genre*, in: *Parages* (Paris 1986).
- 7 Barbara Johnson translated *for* into the English simply as *forum*; one should keep in mind, however, that the two words (*for* and *forum*) appear together in Derrida's text and have a different meaning (see: Derrida, *Fors: The English Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok*, transl. Barbara Johnson, in: N. Abraham and M. Torok, *The Wolf Man's Magic Word: A Cryptonymy*, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis 1986, pp. XI-XLVIII).
- 8 Derrida, *Fors*, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
- 9 I quote after: M. Torok, *Maladie du deuil et fantasme du cadavre exquis*, in: *L'Écorce...*, op. cit., p. 235.
- 10 S. Freud, *Popędy i ich losy*, in: *Psychologia nieświadomości*, transl. R. Reszke, KR: Warszawa 2007, p. 74 (text from 1915).
- 11 Sigmund Freud, *Żaloba i melancholia*, in: idem, *Psychologia nieświadomości*, op. cit., pp. 147-159, see: p. 152. Cf. idem, i.a. *Psychologia zbiorowości*, where "introjection" is used in reference to melancholy (transl. R. Reszke, in: *Pisma społeczne*, KR: Warszawa 1998, p. 89); *Popędy i ich losy* (in: *Psychologia nieświadomości*, op. cit., p. 72); „Ja” i „to” (ibid., p. 235 sqq.).
- 12 Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble*, Routledge, New York 1990, p. 58.
- 13 See: Maria Yassa, *Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok – The inner crypt*, "Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review" 25, 2/2002, p. 7.
- 14 Abraham and Torok, *Deuil ou mélancolie. Introjecter – incorporer*, in: *L'Écorce...*, op. cit., p. 266.
- 15 Butler, op. cit. p. 68.
- 16 See: Abraham and Torok, *Deuil ou mélancolie*, op. cit., p. 267.
- 17 Derrida, *Fors*, op. cit., p. 53.
- 18 Nicolas Abraham, *Notules*, in: *L'Écorce et le noyau*, op. cit., p. 427. See also: Derrida, *Fors*, op. cit., note on p. 42.
- 19 Abraham, *Le fantôme d'Hamlet*, in: *L'Écorce...*, op. cit., p. 449.
- 20 Abraham, *Notules*, op. cit., p. 427. See also: Colin Davis, *Hauntology, Spectres and Phantoms*, "French Studies" 59,3/2005, pp. 373-379.
- 21 Abraham, *Notules*, pp. 449-50. See also: Torok, *Histoire de peur. Le symptôme phobique: retour du refoulé ou retour du fantôme?*, in: *L'Écorce...*, op. cit., p. 439.
- 22 Abraham, *Notules*, p. 427. The conception proposed by Abraham and Torok encouraged researches studying literature to seek in literary texts such deceitful phantoms trying to conceal awkward family secrets unconsciously inherited by authors or narrators. Several examples were discussed by Colin Davis, op. cit. Here, however, this motif appears to be less essential.
- 23 Introjection and incorporation are concepts that, naturally, can be used (even without leaving the sphere of the psychoanalytical discourse) for describing the relation between the recipient and the work - if we recognize the "patient" experiencing loss to be a reader, and a book, a film or a painting to be the lost object (suffice to recall the sorrow we experience each time when at the end of a favourite book were are forced to say farewell to its protagonists). In a normal situation, therefore, I accept the fact that the story has come to an end and its fictitious characters "really" do not exist; nonetheless, "I" can "symbolically" identify with them and accept the "lesson" taught by the work and thus enhance and expand my inner world. Sometimes, however, there appears a fantasmatic wish on the part of the subject to absorb, take over and keep this "object of desire", to preserve it in the permanent shape of "the living dead" – outside the entire system of introjection and beyond the supervision of *tribunal de la conscience* (this situation is excellently exemplified by Annie Wilkes, the lead protagonist of *Misery*, a novel by Stephen King and a motion picture by Rob Reiner (1990) – an obsessive reader of romantic novels about Misery Chastaine, Annie imprisons their author so as to make it impossible for him to "kill off" her favourite character. In another version, the heart of the matter would involve "metalepsy" described by Gérard Genette, in this case obliterating the boundary between the inner world of the text and the empirical world).
- 24 See: Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, *Semiotics and Art History*, "Art Bulletin" 73,2/1991, p. 197.
- 25 Abraham and Torok, *Cryptonymie*, op. cit., p. 232. The term: *cryptomimesis* was proposed by Jodey Castricano in the book: *Cryptomimesis: The Gothic and Jacques Derrida's Ghost Writing*, McGill-Queen's University Press: Montréal: 2001.
- 26 This question was posed by Eugenio Donato in: *Qui Signe 'Flaubert'?*, "MLN" 98, 4/1983, p. 591.
- 27 See: Umberto Eco, *Imię róży*, transl. Adam Szymanowski, PIW: Warszawa 1996.
- 28 Derrida, *Fors*, p. 53, emphasis – W. M. Let us recall upon this occasion that according to Freud Nicholas Copernicus decided to decentralize man's cosmological place in the universe (Sigmund Freud, *Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse*, 1917).
- 29 Derrida expanded his science about phantoms and "hauntology" comprehended as "different ontology" – similarly as reflections about the Ghost in *Hamlet* – in: *Spectres de Marx: l'état de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale*, Galilée: Paris 1993. More on this topic in my book: *Piękna jako bestia* (in print); the presented text is an abbreviated and altered fragment.